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Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis

THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE
NATURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Famous as a lawyer, political activist, democratic theorist, advisor to presidents, and Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Louis Dembitz Brandeis is unquestionably a major figure in American history.1 The greatest part of his fame, of course, arises from his
service on the Supreme Court and the reputation that he earned there
as one of the Court’s truly great Justices.2 Even his severest critics—
and he has a number of them—concede to that greatness.3 One gauge


Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. The author wishes to
thank Jethro K. Lieberman and colleagues at the New York Law School faculty colloquium
for their helpful comments, and New York Law School students Dana Cimera and Jordan
Moss for their assistance in preparing this essay.
1 For a sampling of the many books on Brandeis that are not otherwise cited below, see
generally GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION,
1900-1932 (2009); ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED
LAND (1988); SUZANNE FREEDMAN, LOUIS BRANDEIS: THE PEOPLE’S JUSTICE (1996); ALLON
GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); DAVID C. GROSS, A JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS (1987); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE (1946).
2 Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80
HARV. L. REV. 986, 987 (1967) (“[B]y common consent Brandeis is among the greatest of
Supreme Court judges.”); Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel
and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM. HIST. 125, 125 (1992) (“No one holds a more secure
place in this judicial pantheon than Louis D. Brandeis.”). Brandeis has commonly been
ranked as a great justice. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 403, 445-49 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 93, 122-26 (1995).
3 E.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 135 (1984) (criticizing Brandeis’ flawed
contributions to regulatory theory and practice but conceding his greatness as a judge). For a
qualification of McCraw’s critique, see Nelson L. Dawson, Brandeis and the New Deal, in
BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 38, 38-64 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989). For criticisms of Brandeis
as a lawyer, see, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996), and as a judge, see, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
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of his high standing is the fact that judicial opinions have continued
long after his death to invoke his name, a kind of recognition that he
shares with only a handful of the Court’s hundred-plus Justices who
have passed from the scene.4 Perhaps even more impressive, is the
fact that it is his individual opinions—concurrences and dissents, not
majority opinions—that judges and scholars most commonly cite.5
Brandeis’ “judicial mind,” Alexander Bickel concluded, was “one,
surely, of the half-dozen most influential ones in our history . . .”6 In
this symposium, however, I attempt neither an evaluation of Brandeis’ achievements nor an assessment of his continuing influence.7 InAMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 126, 143, 145,
146, 150 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION].
4
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446 (1990) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,
335-36 (1920)); Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 84 (1936)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander,
297 U.S. at 345-48); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76).
Individual Justices also frequently cite Brandeis by name in their separate opinions, see, e.g.,
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477-79, 483-85); W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186, 216 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co.,
285 U.S. at 311); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 418 (1922)); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1000-01 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 247 (1926)); United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 709-10 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’
dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) and Brandeis’ concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 77); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
5 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S
HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 187 (2015). “Brandeis’s dissents
would lay the foundation for the future and are the great examples of how one can engage in
and affect not just the constitutional dialogue but the larger question of what rights we value
as a free society.” Id. at 151.
6 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Preface to THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, at vi (1957).
7 For an insightful consideration of Brandeis’ continuing relevance, see Jeffrey Rosen,
Why
Brandeis
Matters,
THE
NEW
REPUBLIC
(June
29,
2010),
https://newrepublic.com/article/75902/why-brandeis-matters. For an earlier assessment by
Brandeis’ successor on the Court, see Hon. William O. Douglas, The Lasting Influence of
Mr. Justice Brandeis, 19 TEM. L.Q. 361 (1945).
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stead, more broadly, I want to consider what his career on the
Court—his judicial legacy—can teach us about the nature of American constitutionalism.
II.

BRANDEIS’S JUDICIAL LEGACY

Quite strikingly, Brandeis’ judicial legacy began even before
he went on the high bench in 1916. His famous article on privacy,
published in 1890, resonated with later generations and became a
source repeatedly invoked on the long path that led to the establishment of a constitutional right to privacy.8 Equally well known, his
brief in Muller v. Oregon9 in 1908, the famous “Brandeis brief,”
helped reorient constitutional argumentation by highlighting the importance of the factual context in which rules of law are applied.10
Once on the bench, he pressed both of those ideas, insisting that privacy was a fundamental right11 and that a detailed understanding of
the relevant facts was a prerequisite for wise judging.12 The “logic of
words,” he famously declared, “should yield to the logic of reali-

8 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
to Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 192 (1890)). Douglas, in turn,
wrote for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, expanding the right of privacy to include
fundamental rights involving privacy and the use of contraceptives. 381 U.S. 479, 480-86
(1961). In Griswold, Douglas did not cite Brandeis, but Justice Arthur Goldberg, joined by
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan, concurred and cited Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in Olmstead, which maintained that privacy rights are fundamental. Id. at
494 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
5, at 204 (“[T]he Court and the country have accepted Brandeis’s notion that the Constitution
embodies a right to be let alone.”). It should be noted, however, that Brandeis’ idea of a
right to privacy stemmed from far different concerns and values than did the constitutional
right to privacy that subsequently developed. See, e.g., Richard Chused, Appropriate(d)
Moments, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 109-27 (2015).
9 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
10 On the Brandeis Brief, see PHILLIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE 114-31 (1984) [hereinafter STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE]; MELVIN I. UROFSKY,
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 213-27 (2009). For an argument minimizing the importance of
the Brandeis brief, see David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 9
(2011).
11 E.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney,
274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
12
Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 120,
122 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989) (“The most important contribution of Brandeis to constitutional interpretation and to keeping the Constitution a living one was his emphasis on
facts.”); UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 130 (“One thread that runs through
all his endeavors is the need to know the facts.”). For Brandeis’ judicial use of facts, see,
e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-616 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ties.”13
Brandeis’s judicial legacy, of course, boasts a great many other contributions as well. He had a significant impact on a wide range
of doctrinal areas from antitrust and commercial law to administrative law and utilities regulation,14 and he sometimes exerted an
unacknowledged influence over the Court’s decisions when his internal advocacy among the Justices led them to alter their final opinions
and judgments.15 He was a leader in establishing legislative history
as an important source of judicial reasoning,16 and he was the first
Justice to cite law review articles in his opinions, a practice that initially drew objection but subsequently became widely accepted.17
His famous metaphor of the states as laboratories18—a novel and
classic product of his early twentieth-century Progressivism—created
an enduring image of the federal system, an image that his successors
have repeatedly deployed and that has become widely accepted as a
fundamental principle of federalism.19
13 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). “Unless we
know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we cannot properly decide whether
they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Jay Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 610.
15 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 67-68, 74, 96-99, 101, 202, 212; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 369-70. As one student of the Court concluded from studying several pairs of Justices, “the more influential and effective justice was the one more willing to
moderate the application of his principles in the name of the broader good of the Court and
the country.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES
THAT DEFINED AMERICA 21 (2006).
16 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 59 (“Brandeis’ method of ascertaining legislative purpose, for
which he gained no acceptance in [a particular] case, has made much headway. It is as normal today as it was unusual then for the Court to look to legislative materials for indications
of basic purpose and then to apply broadly or poorly worded statutes in conformity with that
purpose.”). For a discussion of the uses of legislative history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 365, 366 n.5 (1990) (suggesting that
Brandeis also had doubts about legislative history); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1653 (2010) (examining use and significance of legislative history on Court from 1953
to 2006).
17 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 82, 474.
18 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19
E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]he theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is
far from clear.”). Brandeis developed the “states as laboratories” idea long before he went
on the Court. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 165-69 (2007) [hereinafter PURCELL,

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/4

4

Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis

2017

THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS

9

Above all, it was in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence
where Brandeis had his greatest impact.20 His opinions, addressing
such issues as the nature of executive power, the scope of the Commerce Clause, the contours of preemption, and the reach of the police
power helped shape contemporary constitutional law. To cite one
important if relatively technical example, he was a major force in
transforming the Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence under both the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.21
Perhaps most centrally, Brandeis authored enduring opinions
that have shaped our understanding of the nature, role, and limits of
federal judicial power. In one direction, he was a paramount force in
developing ideas of judicial restraint and in forging a variety of doctrines to support the broad principle that federal courts are rigorously
limited in their powers.22 He urged the federal courts to exercise their
authority sparingly, defer in most instances to the actions of the other
levels and branches of government, and invoke the Constitution only
when absolutely necessary.23 In a series of opinions he spelled out
the reasons for giving legislatures broad discretion in enacting regulatory measures,24 allowing ample leeway for administrative agencies

ORIGINALISM]. Reformers “ought to get the full benefit of experiments in individual states”
before proposing federal actions, he argued in 1912. “There is great advantage in the opportunity we have of working out our social problems in the detached laboratories of the different states.” 2 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 640 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy
eds., 1972).
20 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 640 (“[N]o justice of the twentieth century had a greater impact on American constitutional jurisprudence.”).
21 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA, 182-85 (2000); Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1240, 1302-19 (2015).
22 E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 605-23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479-88 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23 See EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS WAS INVENTED 68 (2011) (explaining Brandeis was “the first Supreme
Court Justice to expound fully” on what later became known as “the countermajoritarian difficulty,” the idea that judicial review conflicted with democratic government and should
therefore be exercised only as a last resort).
24 STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF
LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 307 (1994) (“The particularities of a case were always of great
importance to Brandeis, but as we have seen this rarely prevented him from seeking the widest possible powers of discretion for state legislatures.”).
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to use their expertise,25 and adhering strictly to the jurisdictional limits that confined the reach of the federal courts.26 “[T]he most important thing we do,” he famously told Felix Frankfurter, “is not doing.”27
Brandeis not only urged that both policy and discretion frequently counseled restraint, but he also stressed that Article III mandated constitutional limits as well.28 The Court had long held that judicial relief was not available to a claimant who had not suffered an
injury, but since John Marshall’s day it had considered that requirement rooted in the common law principle that judicial relief was
available only when a party had suffered injury from the invasion of a
legal right.29 In an opinion in 1922, however, Brandeis transformed
that injury requirement into an explicitly constitutional limitation on
the federal judicial power.30 “Plaintiff’s alleged interest in the question,” he declared in Fairchild v. Hughes,31 was only a generalized
public concern and not a claim of specific injury particular to the
plaintiff himself.32 Thus, it did not present “a case within the mean-

25

E.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (rebutting
the presumption of facts sufficient to support exercise of police power same for administrative agencies as for legislatures); Great N. Ry. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291
(1922) (identifying the basis of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies in the ability
of “a body of experts” to effectively resolve complex fact issues); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429-42 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v Solum, 247
U.S. 477, 484 (1918) (expanding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907); see also UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 5, at 189-91; Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1042
(1964); G. Edward White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of
Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L.J. 195, 207-08 (1974).
26 PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 120-24;
Paul A. Freund, Introduction to BICKEL, supra note 6, at ch. 1; Preface to BICKEL, supra note
6, at xv-xxi.
27 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299,
313 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
28 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922).
29 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”). As late as 1938, for example, Justice George Sutherland continued to assume that
standing was a requirement based not on Article III but on the common law. LEE, supra note
23, at 77.
30 Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 129.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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ing of [S]ection 2 of [A]rticle [III] of the Constitution.”33 As Evan
Tsen Lee noted in his study of the standing doctrine, “[n]o previous
decision had attributed a plaintiff’s ineligibility to go forward to Article III.”34 Subsequently the idea took hold, and the Court has come to
hold consistently that injury is a core constitutional component of the
standing required to bring an action in the federal courts.35
Brandeis advanced his ideas of judicial restraint in many
opinions36 and ultimately enshrined them most famously in his concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.37 There, he
pulled together a wide range of disparate cases to advance the sweeping proposition that, as a matter of both principle and practice, the
“[t]he Court . . . has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.”38 In doing so, he
framed seven avoidance rules that would bar the federal judiciary
from reaching many constitutional issues in cases.39 Subsequently,
his ideas of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance became
common currency,40 and Justices have repeatedly cited his Ashwander principles in urging the Court to refuse to decide constitutional
issues.41
33

Id.
LEE, supra note 23, at 40. Earlier decisions had referred to the Article III case or controversy limits on the federal judicial power, but they had focused on elements other than
injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (explaining the term case in Article III “implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties,
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication"); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 46-48
(1851) (noting federal judicial power does not extend to claims subject to final review by
executive official).
35 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
36 See, e.g., King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 565 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 72, 74-75 (1922) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
37 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-49, 351, 354-55 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); Jaffe, supra note 2, at 988 (“[T]he Ashwander case is a locus classicus of judicial abstention.”).
38 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 For invocations of his avoidance principles, see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
122-24 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (urging the importance of constitutional avoidance);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318-20 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a
formal avoidance doctrine inspired by Brandeis’ views, see R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). For an analysis of the avoidance doctrines, see generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994).
41 Due to divisions on the merits, Justices often cite Brandeis’ Ashwander concurrence
while disagreeing on the applicability of its avoidance doctrines. E.g., United States v.
34
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While Brandeis advocated numerous doctrines of judicial restraint, he also pressed the Court in another and quite opposite direction, one that ultimately helped establish a far different and more assertive judicial power. World War I and the issue of free speech
proved the catalysts.42 Although Brandeis joined a unanimous bench
in upholding government prosecutions under the Sedition and Espionage Acts in early 1919,43 he quickly began to rethink his position
and by the end of the year broke sharply from the majority. 44 First,
he joined Holmes’s ringing dissent in Abrams v. United States45 that
attempted to transform the Court’s recently announced, but flaccidly
applied, “clear and imminent danger” test into a significant limitation
on governmental power.46 Then, the very next year he struck out on
his own, writing three bold dissents that rejected repressive government actions, two by the federal government under the Espionage Act
and one under a state statute that prohibited interference with military
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697-99 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct.
2020, 2044 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
14-18 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (urging the use of the avoidance doctrine and insisting that the majority reaching the constitutional decision was unnecessary); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532-33, 535-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion and reasoning on avoidance while urging the Court
to reach the issue presented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973)); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 158-59, 163-67 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging a constitutional decision on the
merits).
42 Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 659, 660 (2007) (suggesting that Brandeis’ commitment to free speech grew in part out
of his early reform experiences where open debates on controversial issues proved “crucial
to his success”).
43 See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
44 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, noting
Brandeis’ concurrence with the dissent).
45 250 U.S. 616.
46 Id. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In a unanimous opinion written by Holmes, the
Court articulated its “clear and present danger” test in the first of its World War I First
Amendment cases. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52. For a discussion of the role Holmes and Brandeis played in developing doctrines that gave greater protection to speech, see generally DAVID
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 342-80 (1997). For the ways in which
Brandeis moved beyond Holmes and toward a broader theory of First Amendment protections, see generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s
“First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557 (1999); Pnina Lahav, Holmes
and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J. L. & POL. 451
(1988).
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recruiting.47 In each he sought to strengthen the “clear and present
danger” test as a limit on governmental power and insisted on the
paramount social and political importance of free speech. 48 That
right was invaluable, he maintained in Gilbert v. Minnesota,49 sounding his most fundamental Progressive values, because it protected
freedom of thought, “the privacy and freedom of the home,” and the
“right of free men” to employ reason and public discussion “to strive
for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions.”50
Of even greater long-range importance, his dissent suggested that at
least some parts of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the
concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause and thereby made binding on the states.51 He urged that proposition more forcefully as the
years went by,52 and decades later that proposition became a funda47 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-84 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce
v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270-73 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at
334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at
323-24 (explaining that in the early 1920s Brandeis confided to Frankfurter that he had
“never been quite happy” about agreeing with the Court’s first free speech decisions, when
he had “thought at the subject, not through it. Not until [he] came to write the Pierce [&]
Schaefer cases did [he] understand it.”).
48 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 270-73
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 124 (1993) (“The Gilbert
dissent nonetheless laid the foundation for a major alteration of American law and for a reassessment of political values.”); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 5, at 177-78. Recognizing the extent to which he was breaking new ground, Brandeis
wrote Frankfurter asking that he and Zechariah Chafee, another Harvard Law Professor, review his Gilbert dissent to see if there was “any flaw in the reasoning in the dissent.” Letter
from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 16, 1920), in “HALF BROTHER, HALF
SON”: THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 53 (Melvin I. Urofsky &
David W. Levy, eds., 1991) [hereinafter HALF BROTHER]. Earlier in the year, Chafee had
published a book entitled Freedom of Speech that was highly critical of the government’s
suppression of speech during the war. Lynne Wilson, Book Review: Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Defender of Liberty and Law by Donald L. Smith, 11 U. OF PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387
(1988).
51 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis seemed to pull back from
this contention when he wrote later in his Gilbert dissent that his views were based on the
idea of the privileges and immunities of citizens. Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The case presented “no occasion to consider whether [the Minnesota statute] violates also
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He nonetheless seemed to
make it clear that, if the issue were presented, he would hold that the statute also violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution
from invasion by the states.”).
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mental constitutional principle that would underlie sweeping changes,
transform the law of civil liberties, and substantially broaden the constitutional rights of all Americans.53
By the early 1920s Brandeis began to suggest more pointedly
that the protections of due process should extend beyond property
rights to include all “things that are fundamental.”54 In 1923, breaking with Holmes and many Progressives, he joined the Court’s opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska55 and accepted the proposition that due process included a substantive component that protected family
autonomy rights.56 Two years later, this time with Holmes coming
along, he joined the Court in reaffirming Meyer and holding that
Fourteenth Amendment liberty included the rights of parents and
guardians “to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.”57 The same year he joined Holmes dissent in Gitlow v.
New York58 and declared that “the general principle of free speech”
was “included in the Fourteenth Amendment.”59 Six years later, after
repeatedly urging greater protections for free press,60 he joined Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion for a bare five-Justice majority in Near v. Minnesota61 and held that freedom of the press was also
53 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, The Brandeis Agenda, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA, supra note 12,
at 135 (“For it was Brandeis who pointed the way in the most important jurisprudential development of this century, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating
its provisions through the Fourteenth Amendment.”); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 179.
54 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 320; see also Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at
373 (“Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the
[F]ederal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the right to
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.”).
55 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923).
56 The Court voided a state law that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in primary schools by stretching the liberty that due process protected to include educational and
parental rights that were “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id. at
399. For the opposition of Progressives, including Frankfurter, to Meyer, see GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 377-78 (1994).
57 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a de facto antiCatholic state statute).
58 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.).
59 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482, 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United
States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/4

10

Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis

2017

THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS

15

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Three years after that he
joined Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo’s concurrence in Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California63 assuming that First Amendment “religious liberty” was also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, a proposition that a unanimous Court accepted only six
years later.64
As Brandeis expanded his idea of incorporating fundamental
rights, he also moved to develop a more rigorously protective standard for determining the scope of First Amendment speech rights, an
evolution that culminated in 1927 with his powerful concurrence in
Whitney v. California.65 There, he reiterated many of the First
Amendment themes he had developed since 1920 and issued perhaps
the most compelling defense of free speech in the Court’s history.66
First, he based his defense of free speech on a sweeping principle.67
The “rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental,” and “all
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the [F]ederal Constitution.”68 Second, he rooted that constitutional
principle in the values of free and open democratic government.69
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in
the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
62

Id, at 722-23. In 1936, Brandeis joined the Court in affirming the right of freedom of
the press under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 24344 (1936); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-370 (1931) (affirming the
right of free speech against the strictures of a state criminal syndicalism statute).
63 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
64 Id. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring, joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Brandeis had left the Court the year before Cantwell
was decided.
65 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The case involved a conviction under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act statute, which made it a crime to help organize or join
any group that taught or advocated the use of “unlawful acts of force and violence” as a
means of promoting “political change.” Id. at 359-60. Brandeis concurred in the judgment
affirming the conviction on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Id. at 380; see PHILIPPA STRUM, SPEAKING FREELY: WHITNEY V. CALIFORNIA AND AMERICAN
FREE SPEECH 113-14 (2015).
66 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 681 (1988).
67 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion.70
Third, he advocated an extremely demanding version of the “clear
and present danger” test.71 “The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression,” he declared.72 “There must be the probability of serious injury to the State.”73 In testament to his teaching, the Court in
1969 adopted a similarly stringent test protecting free speech and explicitly overruled the majority opinion in Whitney that Brandeis had
so forcefully challenged.74
On a parallel course, he also inspired an expansion of Fourth
Amendment protections.75 As he had reacted against governmental
repression of free speech and political dissent during and after World
War I, so he grew increasingly disturbed during the 1920s by gov-

70

Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). He continued:
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with
freedom.
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
71 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374.
72 Id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
73
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis continued:
Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger,
whether the danger, if any, was imminent, and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the Legislature. The legislative declaration, like the fact that
the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court of the
State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions have
been satisfied.
Id. at 378-379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). He rephrased the standard at several points, each
stressing the narrow and demanding conditions that must be met before the government
could restrict First Amendment rights. Id. at 373-74, 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
74 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). Brandeis’ “lasting contribution to
democracy itself is the towering opinion he wrote in Whitney” which has “informed all discussions of free speech since.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 641. See,
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (quoting Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence in arguing for the central importance of free speech to democratic government); see
Blasi, supra note 66, at 682-84.
75 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 618. Had Brandeis written nothing but
Olmstead and Whitney, “his impact on American constitutional law would still have been
great.” Id.
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ernment abuses in enforcing Prohibition.76 Although he supported
vigorous police efforts that he recognized as reasonable and necessary,77 as the decade lengthened he became ever more determined to
stop what he regarded as enforcement excesses. He sought to have
the Attorney General curb the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s offensive and sometimes unlawful tactics78 and protested the government’s use of undercover spies.79 Privately deploring “the horrors of
official inquisitorial methods,”80 he believed that the nation’s police
and prosecutorial practices “carry us back to the age of torture.”81
Dissenting from the bench, he criticized government officers for entrapping defendants and chastised judges for showing an excessive
“zeal to punish.”82 Sometimes, too, his views prevailed. In 1924, he
wrote for a unanimous Court holding that brutal and protracted interrogation methods rendered a confession inadmissible,83 and three

76

E.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924); see also Letter from
Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at
231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF
BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June
23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 242-43; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 272; Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 350;
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627.
77 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative States: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Federalism]. Brandeis joined the Court in several decisions strengthening lawenforcement efforts. E.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (holding that state
and federal governments were separate sovereignties, and hence that Double Jeopardy
Clause did not bar separate and subsequent prosecution); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (holding that automobile search did not require a warrant if officers met a relatively undemanding probable cause standard).
78 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627.
79 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 272 (calling for “the needed investigation of the government prostitutes—
sometimes called spies, and euphemistically known as detectives, inspectors, special agents
& intelligence officers”). See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15,
1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix
Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232-33; Letter from Louis
D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 24243.
80 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 28, 1927), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 308-09; see LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE
OF AMERICA’S TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 309-10 (1983).
81 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER,
supra note 50, at 350-51.
82 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1924).
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years later in Gambino v. United States84 he wrote for the Court in
broadening the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.85
Most famously, in 1928 Brandeis issued his ringing dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,86 denouncing the federal government’s
use of wire-tapping as a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.87 In conducting their investigation, federal officers had violated a state’s anti-wiretapping law, and their crime became the government’s crime when the United States Department of Justice
“sought . . . to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own ends.”88 In that case the government “assumed moral
responsibility for the officers’ crimes” and itself became “a lawbreaker.”89 Could the Court, Brandeis asked, “sanction such conduct
on the part of the executive?”90 He flatly rejected the possibility.
“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.”91 Here, too, Brandeis’ separate opinion had a
far-reaching impact, as the Court soon began moving toward his position and eventually limited and then effectively overruled the majority’s opinion in Olmstead.92
Finally, Brandeis pointed the way toward what initially became the idea of “preferred freedoms” and then the more enduring
idea that the judiciary had a special duty to protect both fundamental
rights and “discrete and insular minorities.”93 In the spring of 1936

84

Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
Id. at 312, 314, 317.
86 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
87 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
91 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Privately, Brandeis saw Olmstead
as another example of the Court’s social biases. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix
Frankfurter (June 15, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 333 (“I suppose some reviewer of the wire-tapping decision will discern that in favor of property the Constitution is
liberally construed—in favor of liberty, strictly.”).
92 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (interpreting federal statute broadly
to hold evidence resulting from illegal wiretaps inadmissible in federal prosecutions); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (concurring on the ground that the majority opinion
overrules Olmstead sub silentio); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining that the Olmstead trespass analysis is no longer controlling).
93 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
85
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he concurred alone in St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States94
and proclaimed the existence of a pivotal distinction. The Constitution not only protected all fundamental liberty rights, he declared, but
it also afforded some of those individual liberty rights greater protection than it accorded others.95 The Court, he declared boldly, “has
weighed the relative values of constitutional rights” and placed some
of them—including First Amendment rights—above the rights of
property.96 Two years later he joined Justice Harlan F. Stone’s famous opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.97 and created another bare majority for the far-reaching proposition that Brandeis had suggested as early as 1920, that issues impinging on free
speech, fundamental rights, and the proper functioning of democratic
processes should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.98
Were I attempting to evaluate Brandeis’s judicial legacy, I
would of course have to consider what his many critics have identified as the flaws and failures in his jurisprudence. Brandeis has been
charged with holding deeply misguided economic ideas, for example,
and he has been repeatedly attacked as being too political, too activist, and too result-oriented.99 Indeed, what some people regard as his
94

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 77-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 73, 77, 81 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Two years earlier Brandeis had joined Roberts’s dissent, with Sutherland and Butler, in a 5-4 decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 123 (1934), arguing that due process included the right of a criminal defendant to be
present at all phases of a trial, including a view. Id. at 127-29. There, Roberts distinguished
between due process protection of property, which covered only “actual injury,” and of fair
“procedure in the courts,” which guaranteed not merely “a just result” but also “that the result, whatever, it be, shall be reached in a fair way.” Id. at 137 ((Roberts, J., dissenting).
97 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
98 Id. at 152 n.4. Stone cited Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney in support of the proposition that free speech was critical to the democratic political process. Id. For Brandeis’ early
opinions suggesting such heightened scrutiny, see Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253,
273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 337-38
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For the short-lived “preferred” freedom idea, see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (proclaiming the “preferred place” of First
Amendment rights and citing Carolene Products Co. in support).
99 E.g., WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, at 145-46 “When the
insights generated by an inquiry into facts harmonized with his own predilections, conclusions became irresistible. Once he had drawn conclusions, he was not particularly tolerant of
opposing views, nor terribly anxious, as a judge, to allow them much weight.” WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, 171. “Brandeis was the crusader. No less
than McReynolds, on the far side of the fence, did Brandeis seek to write his own economic
ideas into law.” FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955 227 (1955). See PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE
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“most famous opinion,”100 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,101 has been
subject to extensive and severe criticism, some of it surely warranted.102 One prominent scholar has even argued that Erie was not
merely “wrong” but “pernicious” and that it stands out in the Court’s
long history as “the Worst Decision of all Time.”103 This is perhaps
hyperbole.
In any event my purpose is neither to evaluate Brandeis’ judicial legacy nor to assess the arguments of his critics and defenders. It
is, rather, to consider what his career teaches about the nature of
American constitutionalism. With that in mind, I turn not to what his
critics have said but to the other side of his legacy coin, to the issues
and areas where Brandeis’ ideas have been ignored, discarded, or
flatly rejected—in other words to the cast-offs from his judicial legacy.104
III.

BRANDEIS’S JUDICIAL LEGACY: THE CAST-OFFS

Most arresting is Brandeis’ private belief in the early 1920s
that the Fourteenth Amendment should be repealed.105 Today, of
course, that amendment stands unchallenged as a central pillar of
modern American constitutional law. While his belief was understandable in the context of his time and his political views, this particular Brandeisian idea now seems wholly wrong-headed, potentially
catastrophic, and surely dead and buried.
Equally dead and buried are the assumptions that supported
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 124-32.
100 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 65 (1990).
101 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
102 The decision was “terribly misguided.” Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal
Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 833 (2013). For criticisms, see, e.g.,
MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE DOWN CONSTITUTION ch. 10 (2012); PURCELL,
ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 155-64.
103 Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011).
104 All the great figures in American constitutional history have suffered their cast-offs.
Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued that Congress could make federal questions exclusive to the federal courts, a rule that holds today, but he also maintained that the federal
courts could review state court decisions, a position that was quickly rejected. Similarly,
Chief Justice John Marshall held in Marbury that Congress cannot increase the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, which remains good law, but his contention in the same opinion
that Congress could not alter the Court’s original jurisdiction has been rejected in favor of
allowing Congress to shift cases within that jurisdiction to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
5 U.S. at 138, 174. On various issues, all the great Justices have suffered similar fates.
105 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 325.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/4

16

Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis

2017

THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS

21

Brandeis’ faith in Prohibition.106 His commitment to that disastrous
“social experiment” was intense on both the personal107 and the judicial108 level. Today, such assumptions and such a commitment seem
naive in the extreme and wholly out of accord with contemporary
views and values.
Other typically Brandeisian ideas seem largely passé.109
Brandeis’ faith in science, expert administration, and government
regulation seems, at a minimum, excessively optimistic. The frequency of agency capture, the “revolving door” between regulators
and regulated, and much disappointing practical experience have
combined to chasten hopes and expectations. Contemporary commentators, even if still hopeful, are commonly more skeptical, while
many have become deeply hostile to administrative agencies.110
Along similar lines, Brandeis’ determined opposition to “bigness” in all its forms, a repeated theme in his writings,111 appears tangential if not irrelevant to the pervasively centralized structural conditions of modern life. So, too, his deep hostility to corporations,
another major element in his thinking.112 Although resentments
106

UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 626.
Although Brandeis “liked his beer and an occasional whiskey,” he and his wife Alice
“came to believe that the abolition of strong drink could be in the national interest.”
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 621, 625. Accordingly, Brandeis’ personal
views and behavior changed during Prohibition. “As Brandeis grew older, the ascetic streak
in him strengthened, and he and Alice had no problem eliminating beer, wine, and whiskey
from their household.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 625.
108 “Brandeis’s commitment to upholding prohibition and federal enforcement authority”
exhibited a “breathtaking intensity.” Post, Federalism, supra note 77, at 137 n.451. See generally Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920);
Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921 532-35 (1984).
109 Many of Brandeis’ ideas “seem in retrospect quaint.” POSNER, CARDOZO, supra note
100, at 140. Given the breadth of Brandeis’ jurisprudence and the values he appealed to—
democracy, freedom, localism, etc.—many elements of his jurisprudence remain perennials
and others are periodically revived. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal
Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 186-90 (1996).
110 E.g., STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 335 (referring to “Brandeis’s
belief that unlimited human advancement can be furthered by legislation.”). Brandeis’ faith
was, however, hardly naive. In 1922, for example, he warned a friend not to “pin too much
faith in legislation” for a quite modern reason. “Remedial institutions are apt to fall under the
control of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression.” Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Robert Walter Bruere (Feb. 25, 1922), in V LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 45
(Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978).
111 E.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112 E.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 404 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
107
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against both “bigness” and corporations remain alive, they have almost completely lost legal and constitutional salience. Even during
Brandeis’ lifetime, his attitudes on those subjects seemed unusual if
not extreme,113 and since his retirement national corporations have
not only become ever more deeply embedded in American life but,
more recently, ever more solicitously protected by the Supreme
Court.114
Worse, some of Brandeis’ judicial actions have been discarded and now seem flatly unacceptable. Few would defend his decision
to join Holmes’ opinion in Buck v. Bell115 upholding a state law requiring sterilization of “feeble-minded” institutionalized persons.116
Indeed, only three fleeting years after Brandeis retired a unanimous
Court in effect rejected the opinion he had joined and held a similar
state law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.117
Equally striking, commentators have severely criticized and often
condemned his extensive political involvements while he was on the
bench. There seems to be a general agreement that those extrajudicial efforts were at a minimum disingenuous if not improper and
that, even if not clearly wrong in his day, are most likely unethical
under contemporary standards of judicial conduct.118
113 LOUIS GALAMBOS & BARBARA BARROW SPENCE, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS
IN AMERICA, 1880-1940: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1975) (arguing that

even many Progressives had come to see large-scale corporate enterprise as consistent with
their values).
114 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Saved by the Supreme Court: Rescuing Corporate America,
AM.
CONST.
SOC’Y
FOR
LAW
AND
POL’Y
1
(Oct.
2011),
https://www.asclaw.org/sites/default/files/Morrison_-_Saved_by_the_Supreme_Court.pdf.;
Lee Epstein, William M. Landis, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1431-32 (2013); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular
to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1738-47 (2014).
115 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
116 Id. at 205.
117 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). Indicative of the way that such outmoded decisions are frequently ignored, Melvin Urofsky’s massive biography of Brandeis
relegates Buck to a footnote describing the case in the briefest terms and noting only that it
“is now considered” a “notorious opinion.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at
874.
118 Brandeis’ most recent and highly sympathetic biographer concluded that Brandeis
“maintained a level of extrajudicial activity that, by current standards of judicial ethics,
would be either impermissible or at best questionable in judgment.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 460. For an indictment of Brandeis’ behavior in this regard, see
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982), and for a defense, see Robert Cover,
The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 (May 5, 1982). For a review of
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Even on First Amendment issues, constitutional law has
moved well beyond Brandeis’ emphasis on the instrumental and relatively narrow political grounds for upholding free speech. For
Brandeis, the First Amendment served primarily to protect democratic government and the right of citizens to engage in serious public
discourse.119 By the late twentieth century, however, the Court was
relying on the First Amendment to protect new and far wider categories of “self-expressive” speech and behavior, including nude dancing120 and graphic sexual materials,121 subjects that would surely have
shocked Brandeis and struck him as far outside the First Amendment’s scope and purpose.
Further, many of the Court’s more recent decisions expanding
the scope of corporate speech rights exceed drastically the limits
Brandeis would have welcomed.122 True, he joined the Court in using the First Amendment to protect newspaper corporations from
special taxes directed against the press,123 but that decision was limited to publishing companies that, in his view, served a special democratic purpose in educating the electorate.124 The Court’s more recent
expansions of corporate speech rights would surely have struck
Brandeis as serving that function poorly or not at all. “The sort of
‘advocacy’ of which Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke,” then-Justice William Rehnquist noted while dissenting in a corporate speech case in
1980, “was not the advocacy on the part of a utility to use more of its

some of the literature on the issue, see G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and
Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 610-16 (1996).
119 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
120 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
121 E.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974). For a far broader view of that nature and function of free speech than Brandeis
held, see, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1995).
122 E.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Most likely, Brandeis would have joined the dissent by Justice White that was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 802 (White, J., dissenting). For recent developments, see, e.g.,
Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); Elizabeth M. Silvestri, Free Speech, Free
Press, Free Religion? The Clash Between the Affordable Care Act and the For-Profit Secular Corporation, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257 (2015).
123 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 248 (1936).
124 Id. at 249-50.
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product.”125
First Amendment law has moved even farther from Brandeis’
jurisprudence in other ways as well. The Court’s recent decisions invalidating laws restricting campaign funding by corporations and, especially, its decision to adopt the narrowest possible definition of
“corruption,” contradict Brandeis’ views on both the desirability of
regulating campaign financing and the acute danger of political corruption.126 Similarly, the Court’s recent efforts to turn constitutional
and statutory protections for religion into grounds for defeating both
general social welfare measures and the legal rights of third persons
are inconsistent with his views.127 In spite of his support for incorporating the First Amendment religious clauses into the Fourteenth
Amendment, Brandeis would have seen the rights they conferred as
more limited and unable to restrict the general regulatory powers of
the federal government in social and economic matters.128
Race is an even more obvious area where both popular attitudes and constitutional law have changed radically and consigned
yet more parts of Brandeis’ jurisprudence to the distant past. In
125 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 583, 595
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126 McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014); Citizens United
v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
127 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-64 (2014) (exempting on
statutory grounds closely-held corporations from obligations under the Affordable Care Act).
On the current Court’s use of the First Amendment to defeat federal economic regulation and
social programs, see Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133, 136
(2016). The interpretation of the religion clauses has generally changed as religious alignments and political coalitions have changed over the decades. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr.
& James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279,
281-82 (2001). For current efforts of right-wing Christian groups to use the First Amendment, especially the free speech clause to shape public education, see KATHERINE STEWART,
THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT’S STEALTH ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN
81, 83, 85 (2012).
128 Brandeis joined Cardozo’s concurrence in Hamilton which assumed that the religion
clauses of the First Amendment were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. 293 U.S.
at 265. The opinion, however, stressed that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt individuals from normal obligations of the law. “Never in our history has the notion been accepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to [military] service . . . are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, from
regulation by the state.” Id. at 267. See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty & Adam D. Zenor, Corporate Free Exercise of Religion and the Interpretation of Congressional Intent: Where Will It
End?, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 477-78, 482-83 (2015); see generally Elizabeth Sepper, FreeExercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015). Similarly, Brandeis would likely
have strongly opposed the Court’s recent use of the First Amendment to trump the Establishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995); Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
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Grovey v. Townsend,129 for example, Brandeis joined the Court in
upholding the right of the Texas Democratic Party to hold an “all
white” primary, a decision that the Court overruled only five years
after he left the bench.130 More striking, in both Gong Lum v. Rice131
and South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Kentucky132
Brandeis joined opinions reaffirming the “separate-but-equal” doctrine then enshrined in the now-scorned case of Plessy v. Ferguson.133
In Gong Lum, where the Court upheld the right of Mississippi to classify a young Chinese girl as “colored” and require her to attend a segregated black school, Brandeis stood with the Court.134 More telling,
in South Covington, where a majority upheld a law requiring racial
segregation on an interstate rail line,135 three Justices did dissent,
stressing the uncontested fact that the railway line in question crossed
state lines.136 Even given that interstate context and a dissenting cohort of three other Justices, Brandeis still chose to stay with Plessy.137
In sharp contrast to the passionate dissents he issued in Gilbert,
Olmstead, and so many other cases, he simply went along in race
cases and remained silent.138
129

Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935).
Id. at 47; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
131 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
132 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920).
133 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330-35.
134 Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 87.
135 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 252 U.S. at 404.
136 “There is no conflict of testimony, and the record shows that the company was engaged in the operation of a street railway system whose principal business was interstate
commerce, carrying passengers between Cincinnati and Kentucky cities across the Ohio
River.” Id. at 405 (Day, J., dissenting).
137 In fairness, in a few cases Brandeis joined the Court in providing some protection for
minorities. Those cases, however, not only had the support of a majority of the other Justices but they also involved either utterly indefensible abuses or laws that discriminated explicitly on the basis of race. E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923) (writing for seven
Justices, Holmes reversed convictions of blacks subject to outrageously unfair trials); Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922) (holding unanimously that two Chinese immigrants claiming U.S. citizenship could not be deported without a due process hearing on the
fact of their alleged citizenship). By narrowing the focus and ignoring a great deal, Urofsky
put the issue in the most positive light. “All told, in nearly all the major cases involving African-Americans in which he took part, Brandeis and a majority of the Court upheld the
black petitioners.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 639. For an example of
some of the complexities in the race cases Brandeis participated in, see, e.g., Spillenger,
Reading the Judicial Canon, supra note 2, at 147-48.
138 Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REV. 859,
895 (2001) (“Brandeis’ judicial record on racial issues pales in comparison with his demonstrated commitment to civil and economic liberties” and “evinces a conscious avoidance of
130
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Born and raised in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, Brandeis had seemingly absorbed the views of most white Southerners of the
day, racial views that few Progressives subsequently wished to challenge.139 Whatever the explanation for his racial jurisprudence, however,140 it is clear that Brandeis failed to use his judicial position to
press for significant changes and that he accepted and enforced
Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.141 Thus, his jurisprudence in
this area is far distant from contemporary views and contrary to the
constitutional law that developed in the decades after Brown v. Board
of Education.142
If a bit less obvious, Brandeis’ views on gender equality seem
equally outdated. Although he came to support women’s suffrage
and the opening of some new opportunities for women,143 his views
were far from those that became common in the later twentieth century. Assuming a dominant role in his marriage, he retained many tra-

the race question (whenever such avoidance was possible) and a certain complicity in the
continued subjugation of American blacks.”)). Brandeis’ record was “disappointing with
regard to the rights of black and Asian citizens and resident aliens.” STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330.
139 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 20, 640. In one of his private letters
Brandeis attributed a view he scorned, that scientific truth could be determined by a vote, to
a “darky preacher.” Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 12, 1935), in
HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 563-64. Whatever its impact, Brandeis’ Kentucky upbringing was apparently relatively liberal compared with the upbringing of most white
Southerners. BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 53-56.
140 Baskerville suggests that Brandeis “remained silent” on matters of racial justice because “open advocacy of so unpopular a cause would prove to be the graveyard of his campaigning reputation.” BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 286. Strum suggests more legalistically that Brandeis’ race-related decisions may have been rooted in “[r]espect for state
sovereignty and federalism.” STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 334. For
suggestions about other possible motives, see Bracey, supra note 138, at 905-09.
141 “Neither the social contract [that Brandeis advocated] in the political sphere nor his
proposed economic contract was addressed to the problem of status, equality, and the possibility of self-fulfillment in a society whose governmental and private institutions reflected an
ideology of racism and sexism.” STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50,
at 164. On the widespread racial bias in the United States and on the Supreme Court itself in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly
Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and “Federal
Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2001-38 (2003).
142 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143
See, e.g., STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 163. Brandeis,
for example, made a special personal appeal to President Franklin Roosevelt to appoint
Frances Perkins to the cabinet. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His Clerks, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 163, 181 (2010). When the president did so, Brandeis explained that
Perkins was “the best” and that it was “a distinct advance to have selected a woman for the
Cabinet.” Id.
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ditional and constrictive ideas about gender roles.144 Unlike his focus
on the facts of industrial society and the practical problems of workers, for example, he gave little heed to the social and economic facts
that undergirded structures of gender inequality.145 Again, unlike the
attention he gave to implementing other reforms, he gave scant attention to the practical problems involved in actually achieving gender
equality in practice.146 “Brandeis seems to have assumed that suffrage would be a sufficient condition for true gender equality,”147
Philippa Strum wrote, and he did not consider “how or whether one
got into the workplace in the first instance.”148 Whether one sees his
eponymous brief in Muller v. Oregon149 as marking Brandeis as a
sexist, a clever advocate, or simply a man of his times, constitutional
law has since discarded the argument that women need special protective labor legislation because of their destined child-bearing roles
in society.150 More broadly, it has accepted the key principle that
laws and practices involving alleged gender discrimination deserve a
stricter form of judicial scrutiny.151
Finally, Brandeis’ ideas of liberty and fundamental rights did
not include claims for abortion, sexual freedom, or same-sex marriage.152 One could suggest, of course, that his emphasis on protect144 LEWIS J. P APER, BRANDEIS 196 (1983); STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM,
supra note 50, at 163; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY,
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 113, 124-26, 223-27, 365.
145
STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 224, 594-95.
146 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 223-24.
147 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164.
148 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164.
149 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
150 Compare id. at 421-23 (upholding special statutory protection for female workers),
with United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-200 (1991) (rejecting as discriminatory employer’s policy providing special “protection” for female workers).
On issues of gender equality, Brandeis has fairly been described as “a man of his time” and
“a product of his times.” STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164;
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 364.
151 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For earlier decisions suggesting the
need for greater protections against gender discriminations, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
152 Stressing certain of Brandeis’ statements and values, one could argue that his jurisprudence provides support for such recently recognized rights. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (purpose of government “to make men
free to develop their faculties.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“the right to be let alone” is “the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.”). Justices did on occasion use Brandeis to support
expansions of the right to privacy. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12, 543,
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ing the “privacy and freedom of the home”153 and his support for the
Court’s decisions in both Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters154
provided some support for the Court’s eventual decisions in those areas. Even granted such a connection as a matter of abstract legal argument, however, it remains true that Brandeis’ own views fell far
short of including—or almost certainly even imagining—that such
matters were among the fundamental rights that the Constitution protected.155 His much different and far narrower view of fundamental
rights is hardly surprising given the fact that during his lifetime the
overwhelming majority of Americans were scandalized by ideas of
sexual freedom and would have scorned the idea of providing constitutional protection for either abortion or same-sex marriage. In the
past half-century, of course, all of those matters have come to receive
constitutional protection.156
IV.

CONTRIBUTIONS, CAST-OFFS, AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Both Brandeis’ judicial contributions and his judicial cast-offs
highlight the same fundamental truth. The American Constitution
is—as a matter of indisputable historical fact—a constitution of
change.157 Brandeis’ enduring contributions to the nation’s constitu548-59, 551-52 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting & Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1961) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Such uses were, however,
expansions that Brandeis neither had in mind nor would most likely have accepted. See, e.g.,
Blasi, supra note 66, at 672, 695-96; Farber, supra note 109, at 184-85.
153 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
154 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
155 “It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.” United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
156 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (anti-sodomy law invalid); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(due process right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried
people to possess contraception on the same basis as married couples); Griswold, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right to privacy in sexual matters).
157 Given the facts of constitutional history, “there’s no realistic alternative to a living
constitution.” DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010). Indeed, even the
Constitution’s fundamental federal structure serves as an instrument of change. See, e.g.,
PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at ch.10; ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF
WAR WITHIN (2011); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of
Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2015).
In moments of candor, the Court itself has acknowledged as much. Most famously, Chief
Justice John Marshall explained why a constitution could not properly be filled with innu-
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tional law are rooted in the fact that over the past century Americans
have come to accept and honor many of his ideas and values, while
his cast-offs spotlight the fact that over the same century Americans
have passed over, discarded, or rejected many of his other ideas and
values. Both the contributions and the cast-offs underscore the reality of constitutional change and illuminate its nature.
A.

Brandeis and the Constitution of Change

At the highest authoritative level, members of the Supreme
Court add—even if only by the votes they cast—their own distinctive
inputs to the body of constitutional law and help shape, however
faintly, the prevailing vectors of constitutional change.158 We readily
acknowledge, even if unintentionally, that fundamental truth when
we speak of great Justices from Marshall and Story to the present.
We regard Justices as great when they have left a distinct and enduring imprint on the law, narrowing or eliminating older interpretations
and directions while adding new and different ones. We can and do
merable details but should only mark out its “great outlines” and designate its “important
objects.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). All else should be inferred from
those basic guidelines, he reasoned, and those inferences should properly change as circumstances and needs changed. Id. at 415. The Constitution, Marshall explained, was “intended
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.” Id. In declaring that poll taxes in state and local elections violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court acknowledged that:
[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). “Notions of what constitutes
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.” Id. Similarly, Chief
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the extent to which the Court has infused wholly new
meanings into the Eleventh Amendment when he rejected legal arguments based on its text
as a mere “straw man.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996). The
Court has adopted change explicitly in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. E.g., Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (amendment construed in light of nation’s “evolving
standards of decency.”).
158 KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (2004) (“The Court, in short, is a
flashpoint or a crucible. It sits at the center of the conjunctions, multiple orders, and intercurrences that characterize the American political order, and, aware of its perpetually tenuous claim to authority, a claim based precariously on its status as a law follower rather than a
law creator, labors to reconcile them plausibly in light of concrete, often crosscutting goals
(and often in the absence of them). Only a developmental approach to American constitutionalism can hope to capture these complicated dynamics.”).
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argue about the pedigree, propriety, quality, wisdom, and consequences of the changes each made, but we debate those qualities because each of the great Justices did change the law.
When was the last time you heard a debate about the jurisprudence of most of the Justices who sat with Marshall and Story?
Thomas Todd and Gabriel Duvall, for example, or Smith Thompson
and Robert Trimble? Or about some of the Justices who sat with
Field, Miller, and Bradley after the Civil War? William Strong and
Ward Hunt, or William B. Woods and George Shiras? Indeed, when
was the last time you heard a debate about the contributions of many
twentieth-century Justices? Joseph McKenna and Horace Lurton, or
Joseph R. Lamar and Edward Sanford? James Byrnes and Harold
Burton, or Sherman Minton and Charles Whitaker? Each of those
largely overlooked, if not forgotten, Justices shared one characteristic: none left a noteworthy imprint on the Constitution.
One of the many imprints Brandeis left was, in fact, an explicit openness about the need for and legitimacy of constitutional
change. “The prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment refers to
infamous crimes—a term obviously inviting interpretation in harmony with conditions and opinions prevailing from time to time,” he
wrote in United States v. Moreland.159 And the confinement at issue
was allowable, he continued, because it was certainly not infamous
“to-day.”160 In Olmstead he emphasized that “this Court has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various
clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the [F]athers could
not have dreamed.”161 Indeed, he praised the Fathers for their embrace of change. “Those who won our independence by revolution
were not cowards,” he proclaimed. “They did not fear political
change.”162
Quite explicitly, Brandeis’s jurisprudence was a jurisprudence
of change.163 His characteristic insistence on the necessity of under159

United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450-51 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co, 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North
Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919);
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925)).
162 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151-54.
163 It is worth noting, too, that one of the ironies of Brandeis’ legacy is that it highlights
the fact that Brandeis himself changed while on the bench. Strum, Brandeis: The Public Ac160
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standing the facts was designed for that very purpose.
But the cases which have most engaged the attention
of the Court since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the great development of interstate
commerce present no dispute as to the meaning of
words or clauses. They deal with the application of
admitted constitutional limitations to the varying and
illusive facts of life. Life implies growth. Only
change is abiding. In order to reach sound conclusion
in such cases, we must strive ceaselessly to bring our
opinions into agreement with the facts ascertained.164
The other characteristic elements of his jurisprudence served
the same goal. His justification for free speech, his emphasis on the
promise of science and expertise, his insistence on the importance of
experimentation, and his image of the states as laboratories were all
parts of the same coherent vision. Thus, for example, he not only
urged courts to follow James Bradley Thayer’s highly deferential
“rule of the clear mistake” in order to open more space for legislative
innovations, but in doing so he also expanded the scope of Thayer’s
rule by applying it to the review of state as well as to federal legislation, thus throwing even more doors open for such innovation.165
There “must be power in [both] the states and the nation” he declared
in his powerful dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,166 “to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.”167
On a parallel path, Brandeis sought to encourage the Court ittivist and Freedom of Speech, supra note 42, at 661-63, 708-09 and passim. His view of national authority, the First Amendment, judicial restraint, executive power, and the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment all changed during his tenure on the Court.
164 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151 (quoting an unpublished draft opinion in Stratton v. St.
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. (1930)).
165 PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 154-55. On Thayer’s theory and its reformulation by Brandeis and other Progressive jurists, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand:
The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 884-96 (1995).
166 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Shortly before he became a Justice with the Court
in 1916 Brandeis had forecast those views. The “recent dissatisfaction with our law,” he
then declared, was rooted in “the fact that it had not kept pace with the rapid development of
our political, economic and social ideals.” Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, in BUSINESS –
A PROFESSION 344, 347 (1933). As a result, he continued, it was essential for lawyers and
judges to study the social and economic world so they could properly and effectively address
“the problems of today.” Id. at 362.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 4

32

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

self to make constitutional changes by loosening the grip of stare decisis and thereby encouraging judicial innovation.168 Dissenting in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,169 he maintained that stare decisis was not “a universal inexorable command” but, instead, merely a
matter of “wise policy.”170 The decision to follow or overrule a precedent was “entirely within the discretion of the court.”171 While it
was generally better to follow precedent or wait for legislative action,
he maintained, “in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.”172 The Court “bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning . . . .”173
Not surprisingly, he buttressed his claim with a characteristic assertion: “the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”174 Subsequently the
Court has often invoked that principle, frequently citing yet another
of his opinions that appeared in dissent.175
B.

Understanding the American Constitution of
Change

As a matter of history, the reality of constitutional change is
undeniable, and one might think that everyone understands and accepts that fact.176 Many, however, bemoan such changes or deny
their legitimacy, and in truth there are serious reasons for that reac168

See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 150-52.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(joined by Stone and Roberts, JJ.).
170 Id. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 5, at 192 (stating that “Brandeis was the first justice to suggest that the
Court not feel completely bound by precedent.”). See also LEE, supra note 23, at 39-40;
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking [sic] in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1351-52 (2001).
171 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 406-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 407-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
175 E.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 854-55 (1992) (opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter announcing the judgment of the Court); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991).
176 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367
(2009); MARK TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 39 (2d ed. 2015).
169
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tion.177 If the Constitution changes in meaning and application, they
argue, there is little or no point in having a written constitution.178 If
the Constitution’s meaning and application change, they continue,
there is no guarantee against erratic, subjective, and potentially radical and destructive changes.179 And those protesters surely have one
undeniable truth in their corner: change does not necessarily mean
change for the better, and it does not necessarily mean “progress,”
however defined. It just means change, and possibly change for the
worse.
Brandeis’ justly celebrated concurrence in Olmstead, which
heralded the open nature of many constitutional provisions and the
necessity of adapting them to changing times, illustrates the danger.180 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Brandeis declared,
“do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern
conditions,” and those governments could properly meet those “modern conditions” by enacting laws so innovative that a mere half century earlier they “probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive.”181 The striking point about that statement is that as authority to support it Brandeis cited Buck v. Bell,182 the decision he had
joined the prior year upholding the supposedly “modern” idea promoted by the then-prominent eugenics movement that the “feebleminded” should be sterilized.183 The Court repudiated that decision
177

On the complexities of constitutional interpretation and some of the reasons for criticizing theories of change or denying the legitimacy of interpretative change, see generally
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 321 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
178 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)
(stating that “the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be
construed in the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of
living words that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite
true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they
did not mean when written -- that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they
would have applied then--is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it
in force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.”).
179 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 24 (1985) (stating that “the idea that constitutions must evolve to meet changing
circumstances is an invitation to destroy the rule of law.”).
180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
182 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
183 Id. at 207-08. The decision had strong social support at the time, as the eugenics
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shortly after Brandeis left the bench,184 and it is now widely discredited. The fact that Brandeis cited such a now-rejected decision as
positive support for the desirability of constitutional change and adaptation, however, stands as a stark reminder that the reasons advanced for change are not always sound, that calls for change are not
always benevolent, and that change itself might well prove unwise
and harmful.
Ultimately, then, there are no guarantees, and there are surely
no guarantees in Brandeis’ jurisprudence.185 Those who seek guidance from his legacy are likely to come to different conclusions in
different cases because his jurisprudence—like the Constitution itself—incorporates fundamental and irresolvable tensions.186 Brandeis’ jurisprudence prizes certain values, but it also acknowledges both
that those values have limits and that they may sometimes conflict.
Thus, it urges the courts to both exercise judicial restraint and practice judicial boldness, to both encourage legislative experimentation
and protect fundamental rights, to both uphold the common good and
safeguard individual liberties, to both defer to actions of other governmental institutions and review those actions with exacting scrutiny.187 Brandeis’ jurisprudence, in other words, highlights enduring
movement was prominent in the United States in the 1920s and claimed many followers, including prominent scientists and leading Progressives. See, e.g., Susan Currell, Eugenic Decline and Recovery in Self-Improvement Literature of the Thirties, in POPULAR EUGENICS:
NATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930’S 44 (Susan Currell &
Christina Cogdell eds., 2006); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND
THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 97 (1998); THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS:
RACE, EUGENICS AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 111-12 (2016); PAUL
A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
BUCK V. BELL 174 (2008); DONALD PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES (1968); David
A. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029, 2036 (2014).
184 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942).
185 Even a Brandeisian reliance on “the facts” provides no guarantees, as “facts” may not
actually be relevant—or even “facts”—and “scientific” theories may be flawed, misapplied,
or simply unfounded. “Brandeis briefs” were used in the early twentieth century, for example, to support various forms of racial segregation and discrimination by bringing before the
courts “scientific” evidence of the racial inferiority of blacks and the dangers of race-mixing.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
1870-1970 53-55, 66-68 (2015).
186 Brandeis’ opinions are understandably cited in support of many arguments in many
cases, but quite commonly the Justices disagreed as to their relevance, weight, and application. See, e.g., the cases cited, supra notes 4, 41, 176, 188.
187 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens sparred
over the significance of Brandeis’ principles in New State, where Brandeis praised the states
as laboratories, and his position in Whitney, where he defended free speech. 530 U.S. 640,
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values, illuminates critical tensions, and illustrates methodical and
fact-based reasoning, but it can settle few if any of the newly pressing
controversies that divide Americans in the present and that will surely
divide them in the future.
If there are no guarantees from Brandeis’ jurisprudence, there
are equally no guarantees from anyone else’s. Indeed, there are none
from the United States Constitution itself. Thus, we confront the ultimate truth: The American Constitution and the vital tradition it has
inspired have combined to offer many guides that limit, channel, and
point, but they ultimately require each generation of Americans to
understand, evaluate, and apply those guides according to their own
best lights in the context of altered conditions and novel challenges.
Most American constitutionalists have accepted the fact of
constitutional change and seek to identify reasonable and authorita660-61 (2000). Justice Stevens dissented and invoked New State Ice, while Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the applicability of New State Ice and invoked Whitney instead. Id.
at 660-61, 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The same conflict between those counterpoised
principles occurred in Chandler v. Miller, in which Justice Ginsburg cited Brandeis’ dissent
in Olmstead to support her majority opinion, while Chief Justice Rehnquist countered by citing Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice. 520 U.S. 305, 322, 324 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In Arizona v. Evans, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority and cited
Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice. 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). However, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg dissented separately, with Stevens citing Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead and
Ginsburg citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander. Id. at 18, 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Poe v. Ullman illustrates the inherent tension between Brandeisian activism and Brandeisian
restraint. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) Justice Felix Frankfurter, when considering whether the
plaintiffs had a fundamental right to contraceptives under the Due Process Clause, wrote for
the plurality of four Justices and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for lacking “the immediacy
which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication.” Id. at 508. Frankfurter
also cited Brandeis’ opinion in Ashwander and stressed the importance of judicial restraint,
along with the need to avoid reaching constitutional issues “in advance of the strictest necessity.” Id. at 503. In contrast, Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court’s other leading “conservative,” dissented and explained that the Court’s judgment “does violence to established
concepts of ‘justiciability.’ ” Id. at 522-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan cited Brandeis by
name in three different places and quoted from Brandeis’ opinions in both Gilbert and
Olmstead, terming the latter “the most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty”
that undergirded the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Along
with other precedents, Brandeis’ opinions supported the proposition “that the Constitution
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character,”
and “the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital
privacy . . . . ” Poe, 267 U.S. at 550, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus, such intrusion
“marks an abridgment of important fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is substantial tension, for example,
between Brandeis’ famous commitment to privacy and his insistence on the need for extensive governmental investigatory power to enforce the law, especially against corporate interests. See KERSCH, supra note 158, at 56-60.
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tive norms to determine when and why it is legitimate. Strict “legalists” adopt formalistic methods that strive to cabin and legitimate
change by portraying it as, in some essential sense, not truly change,
but instead only the result of implicit and logical exfoliations from
unchanging constitutional principles.188 Such approaches, employing
varieties of flexible word play, thus accept change by giving it a different name and masking the awkward facts of history with the
smothering blanket of blinkered legal formalism.189
Less formalistic and more realistic constitutionalists accept
and often emphasize the fact of change, adding to the role of constitutional text, structure, and doctrine the shaping force of changing social conditions, cultural values, and political movements.190 At the
same time, however, they also seek to both justify and ultimately
constrain such change by integrating it into some broader normative
vision that offers a reasoned connection to the Constitution.191 Some
emphasize fundamental moral principles that they find embedded in
the Constitution and justify change when it accords with those moral
norms.192 Others justify change by socializing and institutionalizing
188

Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. L. REV. 1243, 1264
(2010).
189 Felix Frankfurter adopted a version of this approach when he defended the New Deal’s
broadened use of the commerce power. He argued that economic changes “bring into play
the affirmative possibilities of the authority over commerce granted to Congress” while
warning against questioning the supremacy of law’s internal logic. Any attempt to interpret
trends in American constitutional history outside the frame of professed doctrine, he declared, “calls for the utmost wariness.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER
MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 8 (1937).
190 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72 (stating “[w]hat [U.S.] constitutional history
shows, though, is that understanding the Constitution as it is requires us to pay relatively little attention to the written Constitution, somewhat more attention to the way in which the
courts interpret the written Constitution, and a great deal of attention to the organization of
politics by political parties under presidential leadership and to the principles that dominant
parties and their presidents articulate.”).
191 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72.
192 Although not a historian, Ronald Dworkin has repeatedly insisted that constitutional
issues and judgments must be grounded in sound judgments of moral philosophy. See
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
3 (1996). The leading constitutional scholar of an earlier generation, Edward Corwin, made
essentially the same point: “[T]he Supreme Court is vested with substantially complete freedom of choice [in construing the constitution, but w]ith this freedom there goes inevitably an
equally broad moral responsibility.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 182 (1934) (emphasis in original). As
a more recent scholar wrote, changes are justified when they make “substantive contributions to the noblest causes that human institutions can and therefore should be made to
serve.” Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE
L.J. 2039, 2075 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction].
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it within the governmental structures that the Constitution establishes,
especially the Article III judiciary.193 One version of the latter approach emphasizes the channeling power of established legal doctrines that work themselves out slowly through those constitutionally
ordained institutions.194 Another version stresses the dual restraining
and adapting powers of a deeply ingrained tradition of careful and
small-step common-law judging.195 Both tend to downplay the direct
impact of external political developments on constitutional interpretation and highlight what they consider as the tenaciously constraining
and channeling force of the law’s internal elements.196
Yet other constitutionalists place greater weight on external
social and political forces197 and justify constitutional change by rooting it not only in a reasoned connection with the Constitution but,
193

Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction, supra note 192, at 2049.
E.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW
DEAL 31 (2000).
195 HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 127 (1990) (stating that “the common-law method of constitutional adjudication . . . better explains the Supreme Court’s role in American government”
than originalism or other theories and “has the advantage of building change into law,
change that takes into account contemporary substantive values as well as participation[ ]
values.”). Accord STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 3-4, 118; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many
and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753,
1815 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication].
196 Disputes about the relative importance of internal and external forces on constitutional
change and on the Supreme Court’s decision making are unanswerable as a general matter
and can only be resolved in terms of specific times, places, issues, judges, and decisions, and
then only to the extent that there is adequate evidence in the historical record. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., National League of Cities: Judicial Decision-Making and the Nature of
Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENVER U.L. REV. 179, 179-80 (2014).
197 In explaining constitutional change, for example, some versions stress the role of mass
social movements. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064
(2002); William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994);
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1326-27 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]. Other versions highlight the driving role of “transformative” presidencies. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 265 (2005) (explaining
that the election of popular presidents with new political mandates created “a recurring institutional dynamic” that repeatedly led the Court to take on “the arduous task of creating a living constitutional law . . . . ”); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON, at xiv (1997) (explaining that “[m]y case
for the presidency is that it has been a singularly persistent source of change, a transformative element engrained in the Constitution itself.”).
194
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more directly, in the Constitution’s underlying principle of popular
sovereignty.198 One variation argues that over time the Court finds
legalistic ways to adapt constitutional law to the prevailing views and
values of the American people and that constitutional change is justified by popular approval from below.199 A second variation focuses
more narrowly on the rise of new political coalitions that come to
dominate the institutions of government through popular elections,
thereby establishing new “regimes” with distinctive constitutional
values that are buoyed by widespread popular support.200 A third variation incorporates “originalist” elements and argues that the Constitution establishes a structural “framework” for democratic politics,
but leaves most substantive policy issues open for determination by
democratic political developments in the future.201 A fourth and
somewhat more formally normative variation confers on certain major changes an express constitutional legitimacy, identifying special
“moments” when particularly powerful and sustained popular move198 Of course, virtually all American constitutionalists base their theories in one way or
another on the Constitution’s principle of popular sovereignty, but the key question always
remains how exactly they explain the connection. “Originalist” theories, for example, commonly argue that the text of the Constitution as understood by the founders and ratifiers is
the only proper basis for constitutional interpretation because it is only the text itself that has
been approved by the people. For one statement of this idea, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 128-29 (1999).
199 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 365-68. See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 247-48 (2004). As Edward S. Corwin wrote in challenging the idea that the Supreme Court was the Constitution’s
sole authoritative voice, “judicial review is a process of popular government.” EDWARD S.
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 176 (Peter Smith 1957) (1938).
200 LUCAS A. P OWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at ix
(2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court is best understood “as part of a ruling regime doing its bit to implement the regime’s policies. Some of its most historically controversial
decisions seem far less controversial when set within the politics of the time. Justices are,
after all, subject to the same economic, social, and intellectual currents as other uppermiddle-class professional elites.”). The classic statement of “regime” theory appears in
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-80 (1957). See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial
Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
511, 519 (2007).
201 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 646 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, The New Originalism] (stating that such “framework
originalism is both originalist and compatible with a living Constitution.”). See also JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 10, 12 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM];
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 456-58 (2013); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE
L.J. 408, 449 (2007).
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ments lead the nation’s political institutions to accept de facto changes as validly adopted constitutional amendments.202
In spite of their sometimes substantial differences, all those
theories accept the fact of constitutional change, and they understand
that change—with varying emphases—as a culturally-rooted, institutionally channeled, professionally disciplined, morally guided, and
politically molded reality. Thus, in their light, it is entirely understandable why, as a general matter, Brandeis’ jurisprudence would
almost necessarily produce both contributions and cast-offs and why,
as a particular matter, only specific historical analysis—not the
words, text, or principles of the Constitution—can truly explain the
origin and fate of each of those contributions and each of those castoffs.
C.

Denying the Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Originalism

Some other commentators, however, acknowledge the fact of
constitutional change but vigorously condemn it.203 The view “that
the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this
Court is charged with a duty to make those changes,” Justice Hugo L.
Black declared, was profoundly wrong.204 Justice Black stated that
“[f]or myself, I must with all due deference reject that philosophy.”205
The founding fathers “knew the need for change,” he explained, and
they provided in Article V’s formal amendment process the only
proper method for making such changes.206
202 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 92-93 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 312 (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3 (2014).
203 EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 281 (stating that “[t]he New Deal is inconsistent with the
principles of limited government and with the constitutional provisions designed to secure
that end.”) (emphasis in original); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 9
(2012) (explaining that a “dynamic began to unfold in the 1870s and accelerated thereafter,”
and in the New Deal the “Supreme Court abandoned the [earlier] competitive rules and instead embraced a constitutional order that facilitates the formation of state cartels . . . . ”).
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, at x-xi
(2006) (discussing that “standard interferences with employment contracts, such as minimum wage laws, antidiscrimination laws (in competitive markets only), collective bargaining laws, and Social Security requirements [are] unconstitutional . . . . ”).
204 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining “[t]hat method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat [old-fashioned] I must add it is good enough for me.”). For a fur-
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Black’s position was hardly new. Such originalist claims
seem intrinsic to a legal system based on a written constitution, and
from the Republic’s earliest years commentators have advanced them
in one form or another to support a spectrum of claims.207 Such
originalists assume that the Constitution today means what it meant
to the founding generation and—their decisive claim—that its original meaning can be identified and deployed to decide specific contemporary issues correctly.208
The essence of the matter, however, is that such specifically
directive originalism is wholly inadequate to justify its pretensions.209
ther in-depth examination on Black and his jurisprudence, see generally GERALD T. DUNNE,
HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A
BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1994). Justice Scalia took a position similar to Black’s in addressing the
Eighth Amendment:
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today’s opinion makes of Hamilton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s conclusion that the meaning of
our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years--not, mind you, that
this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution
has changed. The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to “the
evolving standards of decency,” of our national society . . . . Because I
do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and likeminded foreigners, I dissent.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
207 See, e.g., R.B. BERNSTEIN, Legacies: What History Has Made of the Founding Fathers,
in THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 115, 115-67 (2009); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1, 2 (2005). One
relatively recent form, related to the revival of libertarian and classical economic theory, involves the claim that the Constitution is linked to classical “liberal,” market, social contract
thinking. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 4, 6 (2014); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 5 (2014).
208 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)) (explaining that “[t]he proper course of constitutional interpretation is to give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of
its adoption by the people.”). Most originalists, however, also dilute their methodological
claims in various ways, acknowledging although seldom specifying the limits of the dilution.
See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 130 (2014) (discussing that Justice
Scalia declared in his confirmation hearing, “I think that there are some provisions of the
Constitution that may have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them . . . . ”).
Some hybrid forms of “originalism,” especially those advanced since the 1980s, are far more
modest and embrace the practice of adaptive and changing “interpretations” of the Constitution. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 201, at 10, 12; Balkin, The New
Originalism, supra note 201, at 641.
209 The literature identifying the inadequacies of originalism is vast. The briefest sam-
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The issues that the Constitution clearly settles have long been settled,
while those that it does not clearly settle have become the stuff of
new or recurring constitutional debates, shifting constitutional understandings, and often changing constitutional law.210 Most, if not all,
of the controversial and disputed issues that arise in the modern
world fall into the latter category.
Specifically directive “original” meanings either cannot be
discovered at all or the shards of relevant evidence in the historical
record prove too vague, obscure, diverse, oblique, limited, ambiguous, or contradictory to provide clear and specific direction.211 Further, the nation and the world have changed so drastically since the
founding that many “original” meanings, even if they could be accurately and clearly identified, would not have the practical significance
in the twenty-first century that they were understood to have in the
eighteenth.212 Revealingly, and as a result, originalists have produced
no settled, consistent, and coherent methodology and have, instead,
advanced a seemingly infinite variety of flawed—and usually elusively qualified—theories, methods, and assumptions that have led to
wide ranges of conflicting conclusions.213 Indeed, there seem nearly
pling includes the following: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS (2002); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (2015); H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BASED ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND
POLITICS (2002); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004);
Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311 (1996).
210 Originalist arguments are, in fact, seldom decisive, and they are commonly paired with
other types of arguments that range from the lofty philosophical to the bluntly practical. See,
e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-12 (1921); Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication, supra
note 195, at 1760-63, 1770.
211 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 133 (1996) (stating that “the very extent and diversity of the records of ratification give intellectual license to a host of interpretative strategies . . . [f]rom such a body of
writings, many an interpretation can be plausibly sustained, few conclusively verified or falsified.”). The Court sometimes acknowledges as much. Justice Powell once wrote that “[a]t
most, then, the historical materials show that--to the extent this question was debated--the
intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers [of the Eleventh Amendment] were ambiguous.”).
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84.
212 The Supremacy Clause was “originally” intended to ensure that properly ratified treaties trumped inconsistent state laws, but its meaning was altered over time and then changed
radically in the twentieth century to accommodate profound changes in both the foreign relation needs of the United States and the domestic demands of American politics. See DAVID
L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27
(2016).
213 Some originalists acknowledge many of the differences that divide them. For a de-

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

37

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 4

42

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

as many originalisms as there are originalists, and deciding between
any two versions of specifically directive originalism is like deciding
which of Huck Finn’s raft mates, the Duke or the Dauphin, was of
nobler birth.
Equally to the point, and contrary to its advocates’ claims,214
originalism does little or nothing to confine judicial discretion and
limit subjective constitutional interpretation.215 Originalist arguments
are commonly invoked by all sides in constitutional controversies,
and they are readily adapted to support a wide range of conflicting
positions.216 The sweeping spectacle of contemporary originalisms
does little but confirm that originalist methodologies determine precious little, while the practical goals and ideological premises of their
varying proponents determine almost all.217
tailed discussion of different originalist theories, see Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political
Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2012). Compare, e.g., the disagreements between two
self-proclaimed originalists: RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) with Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative
Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1081 (2005). See generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE
L.J. 239 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional
Theory, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111 (2015); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
214 E.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 47-61; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863-64 (1989).
215 The outcomes of cases are “based on ideology” rather than originalist sources and
show “that originalism is no more constraining than alterative theories of interpretation.”
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 193 (2013). See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153, 163-64 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 160 n.202 (1992).
For an analogous argument about the inevitable need for value judgments in statutory interpretation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation--And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment
Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014).
216 Such divergent originalisms are hardly new. Chief Justice John Marshall relied on
originalist sources in defending the Second Bank of the United States, for example, while
Spencer Roane, one of his principal adversaries, equally invoked originalist arguments to
prove Marshall wrong. PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186. The Chief Justice
wound up charging that Roane’s view of the Constitution’s original meaning stemmed from
“deep-rooted and vindictive hate,” while Roane retorted that Marshall’s interpretation
proved him “a deplorable idiot.” PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186. For other
classic examples of conflicting originalist arguments, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 405, 426-27 (1857), and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (majority opinion).
217 CROSS, supra note 215, at 190-91 (stating that “[t]he study of the results of cases decided using the most prominent originalist sources suggests that the theory is not a meaningful
one in the sense of determining case outcomes. The justices all appear to fit those originalist
sources to the support of their preferred resolution of the case. Originalism is commonly
manipulated.”). In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy appealed to originalist sources in opposing
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In fact, originalist methodologies and the historical materials
that they cite are easily, commonly, and often purposely manipulated.218 Justice Black’s rejection of change by judicial interpretation,
for example, was an act of high irony, for he was one of the Justices
who radically changed the meaning and application of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.219 Similarly, the Court’s recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,220 commonly cited as
a paradigmatic example of originalist reasoning, demonstrates the
same point.221 There, the Justices divided sharply over the interpretation of scattered, diverse, conflicting, and inconclusive historical materials, with the two opposed sides interpreting their self-selected

the conclusions of the dissenting Justice Scalia. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43, 745-46,
752. Similarly, in Citizens United, Justice Stevens dissented using an originalist argument,
while Justice Scalia concurred and advanced an originalist counterargument supporting the
Court’s decision. 558 U.S. 310, 385, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) (proposing originalist interpretation), with AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY (2012) (modifying, and arguably departing from, originalist interpretation), and with
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1084, 1086
(2015) (explaining that “[c]orrecting originalism’s perceived shortcomings forces Amar to
turn ever more intricate interpretative somersaults” and leaves him with “no limiting principle.”).
218 Condemning the views of John Marshall and Daniel Webster, for example, John Taylor of Caroline and John C. Calhoun, had no trouble proving that their extreme states’ rights
doctrines represented the authentic original command of the Constitution. JOHN TAYLOR,
TYRANNY UNMASKED 100 (F. Thornton Miller ed., 1992) (1822) (stating that broad construction of national powers renders the “true intention of the constitution inefficacious and nugatory.”). See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
United States, in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 64,
65 (Ross M. Lence ed. 1992) (explaining that to show that the Constitution did not establish
a national government, “it will be necessary to trace the expression to its origin.”). For a
more recent example, see Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article
III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 337-43 (2010)
(describing Justice Frankfurter’s inconsistent and inaccurate use of appeals to the intent of
the Framers).
219 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89, 91-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that “I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment -- to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of
Rights.”). In Rochin v. California, Black reached his favored result by “torturing the Fifth
Amendment.” 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); POWE, supra note 201, at
227. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119,
120-21 (1965).
220 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 54 U.S. 570 (2008).
221 Id. at 576-77.
See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 345-49 (2009); Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 218, at 1088, 1093.
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shards through their opposed ideological lenses.222 Thus, specifically
directive originalism only produces ever more fully weaponized—but
radically conflicting—versions of the nation’s history and constitutional law.
To label Heller and similar decisions originalist reminds of
the story about Lincoln asking his cabinet how many legs a dog
would “have if you call[ed] its tail a leg.” “Four,” Lincoln famously
answered, for calling the tail a leg does not “make it a leg.” Similarly, calling an opinion originalist does not make it an opinion determined by originalist sources. Heller, in fact, is inconceivable as a
product of constitutional change absent the modern gun-rights
movement, its avid embrace by the Republican Party, and its joint
success in placing on the Supreme Court many ideological compatriots.223
Most important for understanding American constitutionalism, as Heller and other purportedly “originalist” decisions illustrate,
is the fact that originalism is itself a doctrine of constitutional
change.224 In essence, originalism is a rhetorical trope for those who
seek to overturn prevailing meanings and understandings in the name
of allegedly older ones.225 The fact is, however, that those allegedly
222

STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 20 (stating that Heller was as a paradigmatic example of
“[w]hen historical materials are vague or confused, as they routinely will be, there is an
overwhelming temptation for a judge to see in them what the judge wants to see in them.”).
For the arbitrary rhetorical move that anchored the Court’s reasoning, see Steven L. Winter,
Frame Semantics and the ‘Internal Point of View,’ in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 2011 115, 119-20 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
223 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191-95 (2008). Not surprisingly, Heller’s result is fully consistent with the insistent personal values of the opinion’s author. BISKUPIC, supra note 222, at
345-46, 363. Indicative of the manipulability of originalist reasoning and the pressing force
of judicial ideology, consider the position of Heller’s author on substantive due process,
where he argued that such rights should be limited to their “most specific level” of meaning.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Applying that principle, an originalist could readily conclude that the right recognized in Heller should be limited to the keeping
of muzzle-loading, ball-firing, single-shot firearms.
224 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 202, at 11 (stating that “[m]ost successful
political and social movements in America’s history have claimed authority for change in
just this way: either as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution or as a
call for fulfillment of those principles.”).
225
Modern, specifically directive “originalism” flourished within the Republican Party as
a political jurisprudence designed to undermine post-New Deal liberalism and the decisions
of the Warren Court. By claiming that eighteenth- and nineteenth- century attitudes determined constitutional meaning, conservatives believed they could strengthen their legal and
historical arguments against the things they opposed: gay rights, abortion, gun control, affirmative action, social welfare programs, restrictions on the death penalty, expansive tort
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older “original” meanings and understandings are either too vague
and indeterminate to carry the weight claimed for them, or they have
been specifically and selectively retrofitted to advance the particular
contemporary goals and purposes of their current advocates.
It is no surprise, then, that when the New Deal Court changed
the law, it sometimes did so in the name of “restoring” the Constitution’s original meaning.226 Nor that when the Warren Court changed
the law, it too sometimes used originalist rhetoric to help justify those
changes.227 Nor, most recently, that when the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts changed the law, they also sometimes claimed originalist justifications.228 All show that originalism is simply another method of
legal argument, employed when serviceable, sometimes invoked and
sometimes ignored, and functioning to sustain, while seeking to mask
and deny, the reality of American constitutionalism.229 Thus, there is
no realistic question about choosing between a “living” and an
“originalist” constitutionalism, only the question of choosing what
kind of changing constitutionalism Americans wish to acknowledge
and accept.230
liability, rigid separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad federal
anti-discrimination laws. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal
Constitution, 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920--), 127, 161-62 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008). See generally CROSS, supra note 216.
226 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 56-57 (1993). Felix Frankfurter presented
a classic example of New Deal “restorationism:” “After a brave effort to confine the New
Deal,” he wrote, “the old Court surrendered in the spring of 1937--and returned to the Marshall-Taney-Waite view of national power.” Allen R. Kamp, Constitutional Interpretation
and Technological Change, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 219 n.150 (2015) (citing
FRANKFURTER, supra note 190, at 116).
227 The Warren Court “used originalist sources quite frequently, more so than did previous
Courts,” though its “apparent reliance on originalism in some cases may simply have been as
a rhetorical tool in service to an outcome-oriented agenda.” CROSS, supra note 216, at 96.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1, 22-23 (1998); Kelly, supra note 220, at 125.
228 CROSS, supra note 216, at 98; Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 29 n.74 (2009); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 691, 713 (2009).
229 Accord Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 649-50; Colby & Smith, supra note 214, at 307 (stating that originalism “is in fact a loose collection of a staggering array of often inconsistent approaches to constitutional interpretation. And the approaches
themselves continue to change and evolve, sometimes too fast for anyone to keep up.
Originalists might despise the notion of a ‘living constitution,’ but they have gone a long
way toward creating a living constitutionalism of their own--the very existence of which undermines much of their own rhetorical and normative claims to superiority.”).
230 Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 718-19. Of course the Constitution is
not “living,” and it is not an “organism,” as common metaphorical usages might seem to
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Specifically directive originalism thus purports to make the
Constitution something that it is not and cannot be, a predetermined
mandate for future times and the foundation of an unchanging constitutional law. Its ultimate flaw, then, is that in proposing to address
modern controversies it counsels us most unwisely, urging us to turn
from grappling with the pressing challenges of the present to confecting subjectively imagined mandates from the past.
V.

HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE TRUE ORIGINALISM
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

While the Constitution fails to settle most new and controversial issues, it is helpful to remember that it also failed to settle a great
many other issues and that only subsequent social and political developments were able to settle some, but not all, of those.231 The
Constitution did not settle the principle that Congress had the power
to create the First and Second Banks of the United States.232 The
evolution of the party system, the disastrous war of 1812, the growth
of the nation’s economy, the conversion of James Madison, and the
presence of Marshall and Story on the Supreme Court had far more to
do with settling that issue than anything in the Constitution itself.233
suggest. The Constitution instead is the written foundation of American constitutionalism, a
tenacious and evolving practice that seeks to maintain fidelity to its text, principles, structures and values while interpreting, shaping, and applying them in adaptive, effective, and
desirable ways.
231 Examples could be endlessly multiplied. For example, despite its explicit textual mandate, the Constitution did not even settle the principle that treaties were the “supreme Law of
the Land.” U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. To the contrary, the emergence of the United States as
a world power, the complexities of international relations, and intense political opposition to
the emergence of movements for international human rights and domestic civil rights settled
the quite different principle--manifestly contrary to the facial command of the constitutional
text--that treaties are supreme law only under certain special and highly circumscribed political conditions. Martin S. Flaherty, Global Power in an Age of Rights: Historical Commentary, 1946-2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE, 416, 420, 422-23, 426 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, & William S. Dodge
eds., 2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
232 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324 (1819).
233 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 24 JANUARY TO 31
MARCH 1791 275, 276 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974). See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Introduction to
JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1, 3-8 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969) (showing the exchange between John Marshall and Spencer Roane over
the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States.). Opponents of both banks
developed elaborate constitutional and originalist arguments against their constitutionality.
See, e.g., Mr. James Madison, Remarks from Debate in the House of Representatives (Feb.
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The Constitution did not settle the principle that the Union was permanent and that states could not secede.234 The slavery controversy,
the election of Abraham Lincoln, and Northern victory in the Civil
War settled that principle.235 The Constitution did not settle the principle that presidents could conclude binding agreements with foreign
nations without the Senate’s approval.236 Economic expansion, the
demands of international commerce, practicalities of conducting foreign policy, and the emergence of an increasingly powerful executive
branch settled that principle.237 Indeed, the three Civil War Amendments did not settle the principle that governments are required to accord full equality to all Americans or that racial discrimination and
disenfranchisement are unconstitutional.238 Only massive social
changes, the Second World War, the emergence of a vigorous Civil
Rights Movement, and profound shifts in American politics and culture settled—albeit still quite imperfectly—those principles.239
What, in fact, the Constitution itself did originally—and still
does—is essentially five things, none of which is to provide specific
direction in resolving most, if any, seriously controverted modern issues. The Constitution establishes the nation’s complex structure of
2, 1791), in A SECOND FEDERALIST: CONGRESS CREATES A GOVERNMENT 126 (Charles S.
Hyneman & George W. Carey eds., 1967).
234 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700-01 (1868).
235 Id. at 727-28.
236 Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 347 (1955).
237 Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 232, at 217-18, 220-22. Similarly, the Constitution did not settle the principle that the executive can terminate treaties, but that principle has gradually become established. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773,
773 (2014).
238 Baldly ignoring history in an effort to reconcile originalism with the principle of racial
equality, Justice Scalia argued that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “leave no
room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid.” Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a matter of
historical fact, those amendments were understood for some seventy-five years to allow pervasive racial discrimination and abuse in the United States. As late as 1959, after Brown v.
Board of Education, for example, William F. Buckley argued in lofty philosophical terms
that the South had the right to disenfranchise blacks notwithstanding the language of the
Constitution. WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., UP FROM LIBERALISM 126-27, 129-30 (1959). Invoking such an abstract and ahistorical fiat illustrates the plasticity and manipulability of
originalist arguments. See Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist
Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 183-84
(2014).
239 E.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3-6 (2004).
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checking governmental institutions; it prescribes certain basic political and institutional principles such as representative government; it
affirms the inspiring ideal of reasoned and limited constitutional government; it mandates certain republican political and moral values;
and it stands as a paramount and compelling symbol of national unity
and human community.240 Its brilliance—and ultimately its inherent
risk—lies precisely in the fact that it constrains and channels, but
does not direct. Thus, it not only allows change but embraces it,
while at the same time mandating as well as words can that such
change come through the structures it establishes, comports with the
principles it enshrines, and ultimately meets the approval of the people it governs.
Thus, while originalism as a specifically directive method of
constitutional interpretation is a chimera, originalism in a far different
and more realistic sense is vital. American constitutionalism is based
on a shared communal faith that the Constitution is binding and authoritative and that the understandings of its framers and ratifiers may
prove important guides in understanding its meaning, applying its
principles, and honoring its values.241 At a deeply embedded social
and cultural level, such a communal belief is a core component of
American life, law, and government and a profound source of the national unity. Indeed, this seems the Constitution’s most commonly
recognized virtue, one that scholars on all sides embrace.242 That
240

PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 196-200.
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, for example, certainly no originalist, nonetheless followed traditional constitutional argumentation when he invoked “ ‘the free exercise’ of religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation.” Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
242 Not surprisingly, James Madison understood the point. The Constitution, he declared
in his first inaugural address in 1809, was “the cement of the Union.” James Madison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 47, 49 (Gaillard Hunt
ed. 1908); STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 101 (explaining that “[t]he written Constitution is
valuable because it provides a common ground among the American people, and in that way
makes it possible for us to settle disputes that might otherwise be intractable and destructive.”). More recently, James Boyd White made the point from the perspective of language
and rhetoric. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 246 (1984) (discussing
that the Constitution “establishes a new conversation on a permanent basis” and thus “constitutes a rhetorical community.”). For contemporary views, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note
218, at 1113 (explaining that “[b]y encouraging fidelity to the original bargain that created
and renewed the Union, originalism can help to keep that Union alive and well.”); Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, supra note 198, at 1419 (stating that “[w]hen citizens who passionately disagree about the terms of collective life can advance their contending visions as the
outworking of the nation’s founding commitments, they belong to a common community,
241
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communal faith underwrites a sustaining conviction that Americans
share fundamental premises even though, in ever-recurring constitutional disputes, they proceed by drawing from those premises narrower, more particular, and more immediately serviceable principles
that allow them to justify sharply conflicting conclusions.243 That
true communal originalism is not a method of finding specific direction on controverted issues, but part of the social and institutional
glue that helps hold the American people together and induces them
to debate rather than fight.
Thus, the reality of this communal originalism is a fundamental element of the answer to the question that many of those who deny the legitimacy of constitutional change seem to regard—quite
wrongly—as unanswerable: To repeat their question: What is the
point of a written constitution if its meanings and interpretations
change?244 The answer—entirely accurate as a matter of the nation’s
history and crucial to an understanding of its constitutionism—is that,
together with its other establishing contributions, the written Constitution helps knit Americans together in their common effort to maintain a free, open, tolerant, and democratic society. It undergirds a
collective national enterprise in democratic self-government anchored
in efforts to interpret its text, structure, and principles in ways that allow the American people to share a bonding sense of common values
while vigorously and sometimes bitterly disputing the policies necessary to confront the challenges of an ever-changing world.245
To understand American constitutionalism in this manner
helps develop a deeper understanding not just of Americans in the
past, but of ourselves in the present. It is a method that urges us to
try to understand how we come to embrace the values we hold and,
consequently, why we adopt the constitutional views we espouse. It
is especially important for Justices on the United States Supreme
Court, for if they would be truly wise and properly restrained, they
despite deep disagreement about its ideal form.”).
243 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 302 (2008) (stating that “in most constitutional disputes, the disputants are not arguing from common premises.”).
244 As Justice Black stated the point, the idea that the Constitution’s meaning changes over
the years is “an attack” on the very “concept of a written constitution.” GARY L. MCDOWELL,
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 129 (1982).
245 Constitutional change sometimes occurs through the formal amendment process, but
this is relatively rare and frequently of lesser importance, as amendments often function in
large part to ratify social and attitudinal changes that have already occurred or are substantially underway. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 115-18.
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must first understand not just the law, but themselves.246 They must
strive to understand why exactly they hold certain personal views and
values, how many of those views and values were shaped by sources
outside the Constitution, and how some of those views and values
have in turn helped shape their understanding of the Constitution itself. Above all, they must strive to understand how those views and
values may—consciously or unconsciously, properly or improperly—
press them to shape the law in their service. Surely, no candid and
self-conscious judge could possibly consider him or herself as merely
a non-discretionary “umpire” calling balls and strikes in accord with
some pre-existing and objective standard.247
VI. CONCLUSION
Louis Brandeis understood both the underlying communal
function of the Constitution and the institutional tensions it structured
in channeling conflict and enabling reasoned and ordered change.
His jurisprudence embraced that communal function while seeking to
utilize those institutional tensions to the nation’s best advantage. One
can fairly criticize many aspects of his career and jurisprudence, including the methods he used, the values he cherished, the goals he
sought, the reasons he advanced, and the judgments he reached. One
cannot fairly criticize him, however, for attempting—within the limited confines of his judicial role—to articulate reasoned constitutional
arguments supported by empirical evidence and practical insight to
adapt the law to meet what he considered the most pressing needs of
the nation, its people, and its democratic government.
To one degree or another, all Justices have done that, even if
they were largely or wholly unaware of the way their personal views
and values were shaping their constitutional thinking. All the truly
“great” Justices have also done that, too, but they—like Brandeis—
have done so by and large consciously and purposely. That truth
stands—for good as well as possible ill—as an intrinsic, dynamic,
and fundamental element of American constitutionalism.

246 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 41819 (2004).
247 POWE, supra note 200, at 342 (testifying before Congress at the hearing on his nomination to the Court, now Chief Justice John Roberts “absurdly analogized a justice to an umpire.”).
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